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MANAGEMENT OF EXfERNAL DEBT:
NIGERIA'S EXPERIENCE 1
DEB'CMANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT,
CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA. 1.AGOS
Thts paper traces the genesis qf Nigeria's external debt from the periDd prlDr to the introduction of the
Structural Acfjustment Programme (SAP) to the cWTent periDd. 'The factors which combine to bring the external
debt to tts current level comprise borrowings from the multilateral and bilateral Institutions, the accumulatiDn
of trade arrears, default in the repayment qf loans, capUa/izaliDn of unpaid interest, and deprecio.Jion of the
U.S. dollar against other mqjor international currencies In which the loans were contracted. Measures taken
to limit the growth of Nigeria's external debt include embargo on new loans, directives to State Governments
to minimizeextemal borrowings, and theadoptinn ofSAP as well as refmancing, restructuring and rescheduling
of the debt. With regard to the debt owed to the London Club, Nigeria bought back 62 per cent of the debt and
issued collatera.li7.ed Par Bonds for the remaining 38 per cent to achi,me a debt and debt service reduction
through a Brady typedeaL 'The packageobtainedfrom the Parts Clubsofarhas only provided a teml'orary relief
and had neuer provided any debt reduction. lnfact, the debt stock owed to the Club increased despite the fact
that no new debts were procuredfo/Jowing the capitalization of unpaid interest in the consolidatinn periDd. The
other stm1egy adof,ted to reduce the debt stock is the Debt Conversion Programme (DC!'}. For purposes of
achieving enduring debt reliPJ the paper proposes that 50 per cent <if the commercial component slwulrl be
converted to a 30 year collaterallzed Par Bonds, while the remaining 50 per cent slwuld be rescheduled over
a~riDd of25 years withfvced interest rate of5 per cent per annum including <1gmce perilxl of5 years. The
entire government/ODA debts should be rescheduled over a perind<if 25 ye<1rs <1t <1fvc!-'<l interest rute elf 3.5
percentage point belr,w the market rule, irtcluding a grace rw.riDd qf IO years. All the debts s~u,u/rl aL~o be eligiblr,
for conuersilm under the IX;l'.
~ -

Since the collapse of the oil boom In 1981. the Nigerian economy has undergone
¢onsiderable strains and stresses. 1'he pressure has been evident In the persistent
~_!}cits In the balance of payments, low external reserves, deficits in government
finances. mounting external debt etc. The inherent weaknesses in the stmcture oft he
economy as rellecled in the over-dependence on foreign exchange earnings from oil.
undue dependence on imports for its pnxluclive base in the face of declining foreign
exchange earnings and weak lenns of trade led lo a situation In which government
sought to bridge the domestic financial resource gap with external hon-owing.
1be first major borrowing was the Jumbo loan of about US$ l .00 billion which was
contracted In· 1978 from the International capital market (ICM). 1be loan had a short
termmaturilywilhveryhighlnlerestrateandwasusedtofinanceanumberofprojects.
1bereafter more external borrowings from private capital markets were undertaken as
credits from bilateral and multilateral sources dried up. Furthermore some Slate
Governments resorted to imprudent borrowings from external sources to finance all
sorts of projects of doubtful viability.
1be debt problem soon escalated. '!be magnitude and severity of Nigeria's debt
problem is more forcefully demonstrated by movements of certain debt ratios. At 13.3
per cent in 1980, the debt/export ratio rose to 404.2 per cent in 1986 through 341.0
per cent in 1987 and to 241.5 per cent in 1991. 1be ratio of debt/GDP rose
continuously from only 3.8 per cent in 1980 through 62.3 per cent in 1986 to 350.l
per cent in 199_1- Similarly the debt burden as measured by the ratio of debt service/
exports of goods and services rose rapidly from 0. 7 per cent in 1980 through 28. l per
I

Revised edition of tht? Paper ddtven:d by Nigeria at the 1m~ctt11g of the Group of Ftnam:ial E:,qwrL~ of ('i..- 15, Jakarta.
lmlont·sia !May 25-2f>, IH92).
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cent in 1985 to 25.8 per cent in 1991. 1bis ratio would have exceeded 65 per cent since
1985 ·but for payment defaults and subsequent debt restructuring and refinancing.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a proftle of Nigeria's external debt and debt
service since 1980 as well as articulate efforts put in place by the authorities to reduce
the stock and burden of debt in order to promote growth and development of the
economy. The analysis is also aimed at fostering international comparisons, especially
with other debt-distressed Third World countries in their bicl to solve the debt problem.
For ease of presentation, the paper is divided into four parts. Part I highlights the
trends in Nigeria's external debt and debt service burden. Part II focuses on analysis
of the debt management strategies adopted by Government while Part III assesses the
impact of external debt restructuring and refinancing on the external debfstock, debt
service and the debt service ratio. Part IV contains concluding observations, highlighting issues and lessons.
PARfI
TRENDS IN NIGERIA'S EXIERNAL DEBT AND
EXIERNALDEBTSERVICE, 1983- 1991
Nigeria's external debt stock witnessed substantial changes, both in quantum and
structure, between 1983 and 1991. In absolute terms, total external debt outstanding
rose from $17,765 million in 1983 through $25,574 million in 1986 to $23,364 million
in 1991. Thus, between 1983 and 1991, the external debt increased by $15,599
million, representing an annual growth rate of7.3 per cent (See Table 1). In relative
terms, the changes have not been less remarkable. Available statistics showed that
though the ratio of debt outstanding to real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was only
20.5percentin 1983, it had increased to62.3 percent by 1987, risingfurtherto350.l
per cent in 1991. 1bis implies that interest payments apart, Nigeria would need more
than her three years' GDP to pay off her principal debt obligations. The position is no
less alanning when the debt to export ratio is used. At 148.9 per cent in 1983, the debt/
export ratio reached a peak of 418.3 per cent in 1988, declining to 241.5 per cent in
1991 (See Table 3). The daunting increase in the debt stock is a reflection ofincreases
in loans from the ICM as well as the multilateral and bilateral institutions, the
accumulation of trade arrears, default charges on overdue scheduled payments,
capitalisation of unpaid interest and the depreciation of the U.S. dollar against other
major international currencies in which the loans were contracted.
1bere has also been some changes in terms of the structure and composition of the
debt stock. Of the total debt outstanding in 1983, obligations to the Paris Club of
creditors amounted to $5,390 million or 30.3 per cent, while $6,263 million (35.3%),
$884 million (5%) and $1,526 million (8.6%) were owed to the London Club of creditors,
multilateral institutions and "others", respectively. Trade arrears for which promisso:ry
notes were issued from November 1984 amounted to $3,702 million or 20.8 per cent.
By the end of 1985 - the eve of our first rescheduling exercise with the Paris Club the Paris Club's relative share in total debt outstanding had increased to 41.4 per cent
while the London Club's share had declined to 18.8 per cent due to the cash payments
on the unrefinanced trade arrears. It is worthy to note that the Paris Club's relative
share has been on the increase. accounting for 53.3 per cent at the end of 1991 (see
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Table 2).
1be total external debt service payments amounted to $1,984 million in 1983, rising
to $3,359 million in 1984. It increased to $4,029 million in 1985 hut declined to $1,862
million in 1986. However, not only had debt servicing been increasing since 1987,
interest payments as a proportion of the total witnessed substantial increase between
1986 and 1988. The debt service ratio increased from 16.6 per et:nt in 1983 to 25.9 per
cent in 1984, declining to 19.3 per cent in 1987. It however increased to 25.8 percent
in 1991. The external debt service payment to external reserves ratio which was as high
as 190.6 per cent in 1983, reach~d a peak of286.l per cent in 1988 but declined to
88.3 per cent in 1990. By 1991, this ratio had reduced further to 79.8 per cent. Debt
service payments as a proportion of federal government retained revenue increased
from 23.9 per cent in 1983 to 40.5 per cent in 1986 but has since then maintained an
increasing trend, reaching 109.6 per cent in 1991. Th~ dramatic increase in the debt
service payment in 1990 is largely due to the fact thaftwo Paris Club Agreements ran
concurrently between May and December, 1990 (i.e:-·between end of one consolidation
period and the beginning of another): thus requiring substantial payments to service
them.
PART II
ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA'S DEBT MANAGEMENl' STRATEGIES
1be strategies adopted by the Nigerian authorities to manage the country's debt
were carefully designed, not only to ameliorate the debt burden but also to stimulate
sustainable growth in the economy. As a first step the factors that led to the debt
overhang were identified and classified into two broad headings viz:
(i)

domestic factors

these included inappropriate policy measures taken by
government such as the Pre-SAP policy of maintaining
over valued exchange rate for government's importsubstitution industrialisation strategy, pre-SAPexchange
control measures, Pre-SAP inappropriate pricing of agricultural products, inadequate incentive framework for
direct foreign investment, inflation, etc; and

(ii)

extemalfactors

these relate to developments in the oil market, instability
in commodity prices, adverse terms of trade, rtsing
international real interest rates, fluctuations in the
value of key currencies. etc.

Having identified these factors, government took firm and definite measures to
address them. Some of the measures taken were:
(a)
(b)

(c)

embargo on new loans:
directives to State Governments to restrict their external borrowings to the
barest minimum;
adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP);
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(d)
(e)

active support of the international financial communities particularly the
World Bank and the Interp.ational Monetary Fund (IMF): and
debt relief through refinancing, rescheduling and restructuring on terms
consistent with the realities of the countJy's finances.

What follows is a detailed discussion of the measures that were taken by
Government to manage the countJy's external debl
1. REFINANCING OF SHOR!' -TERM TRADE ARREARS
As a result of the economic difllcultles facing the countJy in the early 1980s which
constrained the nation's ability to pay for its imports, arrears of trade debts were
accumulated. The foreign creditors refused to open new lines of credit. To solve the
probleJil, it became necessary to seek for relief by refinancing the trade arrears.
Arrangements were, therefore, entered into with creditors to refinance arrears in
respect ofletters of credit outstanding as at July 13, 1983. A total of US$2, 112 million
worth of letters of credit was refinanced. The main features of this first refinancing
exercise included a repayment period of 30 months from January 1984 to July 1986,
with a grace period of six months. Interest was fixed at LIBOR plus 1% per annum.
Despite this effort, the trade arrears continued to mount, thus further increasing
the level of the countJy's indebtedness. It became absolutely necessary to intensify all
efforts to secure further relief. Thus In 1984. Government decided to refinance the
remaining trade arrears especially those contracted through open accounts and bills
for collection by issuing promissory notes to cover them. 1be terms of the promissory
notes agreement included the payment of Interest at the rate of one per cent above the
arithmetic average of the lending rates quoted by some major international banks In
New York. London and Paris. They also included a maturity period of six years with a
grace period of 2 1/ 2 years and the redemption of the notes in 14 equal quarterly
instalments beginning from October 1986. However, following the difficulty In servicing
the debt under these terms, the agreement was renegotiated leading to the stretching
of the repayment period over 22 years with an effective rate of return of 5 per cent per
annum. The new terms are generally believed to be the best relief package which the
countJy has got. The total value of Promissory notes Issued amounted to US$4.8
billion.

2.

RESCHEDULING AND RESTRUCTURING OF COMMERCIAL BANKS' DEfil'S
(i.e. WNDON CLUB DEB1'S)

LondQn Club debts covered arrears of commercial bank debts which were incurred
through the medium ofletters of credit. These debts were those that were accumulated
after the first refinancing exercise of 1983. Negotiations with the Club commenced in
1986 and the agreement to refinance and restructure the debts were signed on 23rd
November, 1987. Under the agreement, a total sum ofUS$2.8 billion of incorporated
and payable debts were refinanced. while US$3 billion of medium and long-term
component of the debt was restructured. Thus the total exposure of banks' debts
amounted to US$5.8 billion. The terms of the 1987 agreement Included Interest rate
of 11 / 4% per annum above LIBOR with a repayment period of over five years. The
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banks were to provide new money of US$320 million. Under the terms of the
agreement the countty was required to repay US$1.345 billion per annum. The high
debt seIVice obligation made it impossible for the countty to meet its commitment and
consequently it defaulted. The banks, in tum, did not provide new money. This
necessitated a new round of renegotiation of the agreement with the Club.
New agreements known as the Refinancing and Restructuring Amendment
Agreements were signed on 22nd March, 1989. The agreements contained a menu of
options designed to provide the country with further debt seIVice relief. The options
included longer terms of repayment, conversion of payable debt into interest bearing
Naira denominated securities with a coupon rate of 13.25% per annum and with a
maturity of 18 months. The agreements further provided for interest rate_ that varied
fromzeropercentperannumforpayabledebttoLIBORplusamarginoF ///operannum
for trade debts and 13 / 1//o per annum for medium/long term debts. The agreements
had the effect of reducing payments to the Club from US$ l .345 billion under the 1987
agreement to US$7 l l million. However the cashflow situation of the country could not
absorb such a high debt service rate as provided for under the 1989 amendment
agreements.
Consequently, the country once more approached the banks in March 1990 with
a request for the entire debt to be restructured. The country's proposal was designed
to achieve an effective debt service reduction. Essentially. the proposal was for the
conversion of all the commercial banks' debt into a 30-year bond with a grace period
of 10 years and at an interest rate of 3% per annum. The banks made a counter
proposal which contained a menu of options viz:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

debt buyback;
issuance of Par Bonds with principal and interest collateralised; and
traditional rescheduling.

Following these proposals both sides entered into an intensive and protracted
negotiations which lasted for one year and on March 1, 1991 an agreement in principle
was reached. The highlights included:
conversion of the debts into a single currency denomination i.e. US dollar;
debt buyback;
issuance of a 30-year Par Bonds with principal amount fully collateralised
with US Treasury Zero coupon or equivalent US obligations and interest
amount for one year also collateralised;
fixed interest rate of 6.250/c) per annum on the Par Bonds;
traditional rescheduling with interest rate of LIBOR plus 13/ 16% and repayment period of20 years (1 0years grace period and 10years repayment period).
banks favouring the traditional option were required to provide new money of
up to 100/4 of the amount so committed;
interest on the new money to be LIBOR plus 1% per annum.
The implementation of the agreement ran into a hitch when Nigeria offered to
collateralise the Par Bonds with the Resolution Funding Corporation Zero Coupon
Bonds (REFCORP BONDS) instead of US Treasury Zero coupons. The argument was
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that the agreement provided for an alternative which would be equivalent to a US
Treasury obligation. The country argued very firmly that REFCORP Bonds were
equivalent to US Treasury Zero coupons. The banks rejected the collateral and this led
to a stalemate and consequently both sides went back to the negotiation table.
The negotiation resulted in a revision of some of the terms of the agreement. The
highlights of the revision included:
Principal amount to be collateralised with US Treasury Zero Coupon Bonds;
Interest rate was flxed at 5 1 / 2% per annum for the first three years and at
6.25% per annum thereafter; and
banks that elected for the traditional rescheduling were required to provide
20% of the amount so committed to the option.
The agreement was successfully closed. on January 21, 1992 and Nigeria bought
back 62% of the debt and issued collateralised Par Bonds for the remaining 38%. Thus
the country was able to achieve a debt and debt service reduction through a Brady type
deal.
3. PARIS CLUB RESCHEDULING
Nigeria first entered into an agreement with the Paris Club in December 1986. Since
then there has been two other similar agreements with the Club in March 1989 and
January 1991. The first two agreements provided for rescheduling under conventional
or traditional terms with market related interest rates. Under the 1991 rescheduling
exercise, the debts were rescheduled on terms applicable to the medium income
heavily indebted countries of the lower category. The country was grouped along with
Congo, Morocco, Hunduras and El-Salvador which had earlier been accorded a similar
treatment by the Paris Club. Debts reschedul~ under the 1991 agreement amounted
to US$3.2 billion.
At US$17, 793 million at the end of December, 1991, Paris Club debt constitutes
about 53.6 per cent of the country's total debt stock and its debt service commitments
results in substantial net outflow of foreign exchange. The debt ts. therefore, the most
significant overhang which needs to be adequately addressed in order to accelerate the
much-needed economic growth.
It is, however, recognised that the Club provides other concessional rescheduling
terms like the Toronto terms. Trinidad terms, Poland/Egypt terms and Benin/
Nicaragua initiatives which are designed to provide the beneficiary debtor countries
with debt and debt service reduction. Despite Nigeria's efforts at securing any of these
concessional rescheduling terms the Paris Club has not deemed it flt to grant any
concession, probably because of the Club's exaggerated notion of the country's wealth
and resources.
The package which the country had obtained from the Club had only provided very
temporary relief and had not resulted in any way in the reduction of the net present
value of the debt. The package was always structured to apply only to maturitios falling
due within a consolidation period of about 15 months and not the entire debt stock.
This has made rescheduling under the Paris Club very complex and complicated as
several agreements could run concurrently.
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Other debt management schemes adopted by the country included:
Debt Conversion Programme (DCP) -This was introduced in July 1988. The
main objectives were to reduce the external debt stock and lighten the debt
service burden, encourage capital inflows including repatriation offlight capital;
and assist the recapitalization of private sector investment and the generation
of employment opportunities. Eligible debt was initially limited to promissoiy
notes but later expanded to cover bank debts. As at end-1991 a total sum of
US$632.5 million has been converted under the programme.
PARTIII

IMPACT OF EXTERNAL DEBT RESTRUCI1.JRING, REFINANCING AND
RESCHEDULING ON NIGERIA'S EXTERNAL DEBT STOCK AND DEBT SERVICE
The impact of the Paris Club rescheduling exercises so far is that the debt stock
increased significantly in the period under review despite the fact that no new debts
were procured. Under the assumption that another traditional rescheduling agreement similar to the one that was signed in 1991 would be obtained in 1992, a debt
service reliefofUS$1.975.5 million and US$1.063.9 million would be enjoyed within
the consolidation period of 1992 and 1993, respectively. Thereafter normal but higher
debt service burden would emerge. For instance in 1994 the debt service will rtse to
US$2,883 million compared with US$1,809.4 million in 1993. Also, the outstanding
debt to the Club would increase from $16,765 million to $17,934 million due to the
consolidation exercise (~ table 4).
In the case of the London Club, payments made to the Club from 1987 to end-1991
amounted to US$1,918.6 million. These payments represented payable Debt repayments; and interest payments on Refinanced Letters of Credit and Restructured debt.
Due to exchange rate variations the stock of the debt rose from US$5.86 billion to well
over US$5.98 billion betweeri 1987 and 1991. However, with the restructuring of the
debt under the Brady type arrangement the stock has been reduced to US$2.050
billion. In the same vein outstanding debt stock on Promissoiy Notes at the end of 1991
amounted to US$4.4 79 billion which is slightly lower than the 1988 stock of US$4.8
billion. Under the Debt Conversion Programme (DCP) up to US$632. l>million debt had
been redeemed by the end of 1991, but this constitutes a veiy small proportion of the
total debt stock.
The most positive impact ofour debt management strategies is felt in the debt service
reliefs they had offered. Following the rescheduling of debt concluded, the debt service
payments in 1983 amounted to $1,984 million, rising to $3.359 million and $4,029
milion in 1984 and 1985, respectively. Assuming no rescheduling was undertaken, the
corresponding obligations for those years would have been $2.184 million. $4.143
million and $4,784 million, respectively.
Debt service obligations, with rescheduling, were $1,862 million. $1,602 million
and $1.933 million, in 1986, 1987 and 1988, respectively, compared with obligations
of$6,079 million, $6,420 million and $5,889 million in those years, respectively, ifwe
had not rescheduled. 1be corresponding· figures for 1989, 1990 and 1991 were $1,909
million, $3,839 million and $3,565 million as against $5,889, $5,610 and $7,542
million, respectively without rescheduling.
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The debt service ratios declined remarkably in the review period. reflecting the
decline in debt service obligations following debt rescheduling. With rescheduling. debt
service ratios ranged between 13.7 per cent and 25.8 per cent in the period 1986
through 1991 compared with a range of54.6 per cent and 81.3 per cent if rescheduling
had not bc.-en undertaken (See table 5).
The results of analysis indicate that the performance of the debt management
strategies adopted by Government was mixed. Although short term reliefs from debt
seIVice burden were recorded, given the nature of rescheduling undertaken in the case
of the Paris Club, involving the compounding of principal and interest in the
consolidation period averaging about 15 months, the debt overhang was hardly
reduced.
PROPOSED SOLlTTION
Arising from the above analysis, it has become necessaiy to propose a solution for
Paris Club debts based on our experience so far. A distinction should be made between
commercial debts and Government/ODA debts and each categoiy should be treated
differently. The debts should be treated as follows:
A.

Commercial Debts
(i)
(ii)

B.

convert 50percentoftheenUrecommercialdebtsintoa30-yearcollateralised
Par Bonds; and
reschedule the remaining 50 per cent over a period of 25 years with fuced
interest rate of 5 per cent per annum including a grace period of 5 years.

Govemmenl/ODA debts

Reschedule the entire government/ODA debts over.a period of25 years at a fixed
interest rate of3.5 percentage points below the market ~te i.e. 2.7 per cent per
annum) including a grace period of 10 years.
All the debts should be eligible for conversion under the Debt Conversion
Programme.
Financial Implications of the Proposal

Under the proposal, debt service obligation in the first year would amount to
US$ l ,84 l. 50 million and thereafter would fall to 0S$940.99 million per annum during
the grace period. The debt service figure fot the first year would be so high because of
the need to provide collateral for the principal amount. After the grace period. debt
service obligation would rise to 0S$1,368.53 million per annum and would remain so
until the entire debt is fully repaid.
COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAlj
Apart from providing cash flow relieC the propo<;al has many advantages. First ii
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addresses the entire debt and not maturities d~ within a con~idation penqcL .'Ille
advantage is that once 50 per. cent of th~ commercial debt is collateralised, the debtor
country would only have to bother about interest payment Qn that portion of.the debt
as the principal is guaranteed for repayment at the maturity of the Par Bond. Another
advantage is that the debt stock..,.woulc :.ot i n ~ Without contracting new debt;
whereas tl:e traditional rescheduling arrangeme1.11t provided by Parts Club tends to
increase the_ debt stock through capitalisation of interest amounts due witlun a
consolidation period.
The proposal would eliminate the complexity of ~aging Paris Club debts, which
tends to get complicated when two or more agreements run concurrently.
Although, we do recognise that some creditor COUli,tries may have some regulatory
constraints in implementing the proposal, it is our firm belief that an arrangement
based on the package would be mutually beneficial to both the creditor and the debtor
in providing a lasting solution to the Paris Club debt problem and therefore calls for
serious consideration.
PARflV

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: ISSUES AND LESSONS

This paper has discussed the external debt problem, articulated the measures put
in place by Government to ameliorate it and assessed the successes so far achieved.
The paper also observed that the magnitude of the external debt outstanding
mirrors the impact of pressures under which the economy has been functioning
especially since the eruption of the oil crisis in 1981. Besides the rapid accumulation
of trade arrears from 1982. the debt problem has been traced to the fall in crude oil
prices, collapse in comrrnxlity prices and the protracted softening of the world oil
market since 1981 wi"th the resultant decline in foreign exchange earnings and
pressure on the balance of payments.
The paper further highlighted the debt management strategies adopted by Government whi~h were evident in the agreements reached with London and Paris Clubs of
creditors. Under the London Club agreement. the country achieved a debt and debt
seJVtce reduction, thus reducing to a tolerable Jevel the impact of the annual debt
seJVtce obligations to the Club on the country'seashflow. 1be debt seryice obligation
was reduced from $700 million to about $113 million per annum.
The situation with the Parts Club is quite different. All the agreements reached with
the club were based on traditional rescheduling terms. These terms had the effect of
increasing the quantum of the debt without the country contracting new loans. The
debts. it was observed. were increased through capitalisation of interests due within
consolidation periods. In effect the Paris Club debt constitutes a single major element
in the Nigerian debt stmcture which still needs to be adequately addressed if the
country is to get out of the debt overhang.
In spite ofthe ameliorating etlects of the debt management strategies adopted so far.
especially in terms of moderating the outflow of resources in the form of debt service
payments and the financing gap in the balance of payments. the debt burden has
slowed down economic development and exacerbated socio-economic problems. The
accumulation of trade arrears and defaults on debt seJVtcing would have led to some
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erosion in the country's credit-worthiness. The protracted restructuring exercises,
under the London Club and the Paris Club of creditors have been complex and
expensive and tended to divert attention from the more important issues of growth and
development. Besides, the "new money" packages in the restructuring arrangements
never materialised, thereby making the problem of adjustment more hurclensome.

LESSONS
A number of lessons have emerged from the country's ~id to minimise the debt
burden.
First. monetary. fiscal and exchange rate policies adopted must be restructured and
tailored at all times to discourage import demand. The raw materials used for
production of goods in the economy must be sourced Internally to a large exlent in the
medium term.
Second, while reinforcing the implementation of the policy of payment for imports
on currr.nt basis, there is need at all times to tie external borrowing to projects or
Income generating assets.
Third, the importance of external borrowing to promote investment in the economy
is well recognised. However, the problem Is that the debt stock as well as the debt
burden might increase. if the experience of defaults in payments on principal and
interest as and when due is replicated. 'Jbere is therefore. need to create a more
conducive environment for foreign capital inflow in the form of direct foreign investment.
Fourth, while reinforcing the implementation of the Federal Government external
borrowing policy enunciated in 1988 with stringent provisions on loan acquisition,
loan agreements, drawings and repayments with respect to State Government.3 and
Parastalals. there Is urgent need to keep a lid on private sector external borrowi;igs.
Fifth. a more aggressive debt management strategy which would borrow largely from
the London Club's approach whole incorporating elements of the Toronto and Trinidad
terms should be adopted for the Paris Club debt which accounts for over 50 per cent
of Nigeria's debt overhang.
TABLE I
EXIBRNAL PUBLIC DEBT O1.ITSTANDINC
USS Mil.LION

MulUlateral
Parts Club
London Club
Promlaaory Notea.
Others
Total

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

844

5,390
6,263
3,702
1,526

1,097
5,811
4,996
4,125
1,318

1,317
7,833
3,560
4,255
1,939

1.887
10,228
6,088
4.498
2,873

2,985
12,589
5,860
4,850
2,032

2.838
14,400
5,960
4,810
2,685

3,171
15,871
5,680
4,553
2,311

3,642
17,171
5,861
4,550
2,675

3.650
17,793
5,988
4,479
1,454

17,765

17,347

18,904

25,574

28,316

30,693

31,586

33,099

33,364

Memotandum Items:
Shan: In total debt (%)
Parts Club
London Club
MulUlateral

30.3
35.3
5.0

33.5
28.8
6.3

41.4
18.B
7.0

40.0
23.8
7.4

44.5
20.7
10.5

46.9
19.4
9.2

50.2
18.0
10.0

51.9
17.7
11.6

53.3
17.9
10.9
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TABLE2

ECONOMIC VARIABLES POR MEASURING DEBT SERVICE RATIOS
USIMIWON1
1983

o - Damostlc Pn,d. (ODPI

JIIN

,

I-

I-

IN7

1988

111119

IHO'

19912

17,823

17,139

11,340

11,250

9,530

1,827
1,170
721
3,436
3,622
4,064
28,316 30.693 31,51111
1,909
1,602
1,933
N/A
N/A
N/A

4,485
3,252
33,364
3,565
1,959
1,606
13,815
7,756

9.9095

1111.1135

112.125

77,226

41,030

1,041
8,308
17,765
1.984
N/A

1,491
9,119
17,347
3,358
N/A

1,839
10,896
18,904
4,029
N/A

2,071
4,601
25,574
1,862
N/A

11,930
11,036

12,977
8,848

14,356
7,458

6,327
3,161

8,305
4,130

7,337
4,355

8,703
3,693

4,350
4,910
33,099
3,839
1,928
1,911
14,540
4,948

0.7506

0.7672

0.8924

1.7323

3.9691

4.5367

7.3651

8.0378

lat 1984 hl;IDr Coetl
ExtemalAleerwa

Fed. Ocwt. - - Revenue
External Debt
External Debt Service:Pr1nclpal
imere.t
Export of Oooda a, Impart of Oooda & SelVlca

Memonlndum Ilana:
N/(USIJ

I. Except ror atanal clebl Ogura, olhcn wa-e dertv,,d from nalra denomlnalcd slaUsllcs. con..,rtcd al the exchange rates
atated above.
2. TABLE3
DEBT SERVICING CAPACITY RATIOS

1983
RaUo1

Debt Service
Debt llerv. ID Eat. Rnerwe'
~..,_IDlmport
(lnMonthal
Debt llerv. ID 0cwt. ........

Debt ID O.D.P.
Debt to ltxporta
I.

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

/990

1989

1991

25.9
225.3
2.0

28.1
219.1
3.0

29.4
89.9
7.9

19.3
136.9
3.4

26.3
268.1
2.0

21.9
104.5
5.9

26.4
88.3
10.5

25.fl
79.8
6.9

23.9

36.8

20.5

21.1
133.7

37.0
24.11
131.7

40.5
62.3
404.2

39.4
1118.9
341.0

156.3
179.1
418.3

52.7
278.11
362.9

78.2
294.2
227.6

109.6
350.1
241.5

16.6
190.8
1.1

148.9

n- ratloe reflect the Impact of debt rescheduling.
TABLES
DEBT SERVICING CAPACnY RATIOS IF lllEIIB HAD DEEN NO RESCHEl>UUNC'

1983
External Debt Service:Export ol Oooda a 11erv1ce11
Fed. Ocwt. Rebdned Aewenue
Debt llerv. ID Ocwt. Revenue
Debt Semoe Ratio

1984

1985

2,184
4,143
4.784
11,930 12,977
14.356
8,306
9,119
10,896
43.9
26.3
45.4
33.3
18.3
31.9

1986

1987

1988

l9H9

1990'

5,141
6,079
6,420
5.flfl9
5,810
6,327
8,305
7.337
8,703
14,540
4,601
4,064
3,436
3,622
4,910
111.7
149.8
1116.8
162.6
114.3
81.3
73.2
87.5
67.7
38.6

1991 2

7,542
13,815
3,252
231.9
114.6

~qema:

N/(USII

0.71106

0.7672

0.8924

1.7323

3.9691

4.5367

7.3651

8.0378

9.9085

I. Except l"or extemal debt n,u-. othen -re dertved from nnlra denominated slallsUcs, con""rtcd at the exchange rain
atated above.
2.Eallmata
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TABLE4
PARIS CLUB DEBT STOCK AND'DEOT,SE-RVICE PROJECTIONS UNm:R TIIE
NO-RESCHEDUUHO AND 'lRADl110NAL RESCHEDUUNO Ol'l'IONS (US I MIWONI

DEBTSfOCK
P

le71111.H

I ... ·- ........

l7NS.MI---

139UN)

W.29

D&9T

...

·- I
I

,

,._.

754.91

I

P I T

T

13311.38 ·27:to.>&

• -SRY tC&

P

·I

.L

T

p

l1!05.e1

tl&T.51

Mn.3t 157• .n-

112$.17

2704.ae

129.0_..

I 922.51

---

UIOIUI 11579.72

1303.78

2883.48

1,2ao.-,.

·-

I,!['

aa.• 2152:.93

~

2331.50

I

I

SUMMARY OF DEBT RELIEF ARISING Fl.:>M TRADITIONAL RESCHEDULING omoN
(USIMIWONI
O&BT SERVICE

·-

DEBTSfOCK

0,00

uee.ss

I

Tradmon • I Ruch.

-1004.74

0.00

·-

I

P I T

0.00

•970.72 -197&.48

I

I

P I T

0.00

-683.211

O.OD

o.oo

-380.81 -10&.1. • I

I

·-

·-

I

P I T

0.00

0.00

o.oo

o.oo

178.59

11a.se

I

P I T

0.00

o.oo

0.00

0.00

I 78.51

178.511
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